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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
GILBERT E. BURNS,
Defendant, Third-Party
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Number 14640

vs.
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Defendant
and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was an action for repossession and sale of a
certain recreational trailer, and for attorney fees and
deficiency judgment.

Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff and

Appellant GILBERT E. BURNS answered the Complaint, and crossclaimed against Third-Party Defendant and Respondent U. & S.
MOTOR COMPANY claiming breach of warranty, and thereafter
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sought statutory damages for failure of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY
to follow mandatory procedures in the repossession and sale
of the recreational trailer.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND
IN PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable J. Harlan
Burns, sitting without a jury.

Judgment was entered in favor

of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant BURNS, and against
Third-Party Defendant/Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY.

U. & S

MOTOR COMPANY appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed and
remanded, with instructions to the lower court to sell the
recreational trailer, to determine the amount of deficiency,
if any, and to determine attorney fees and costs.

In the lower

court, U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY sought a deficiency judgment and
attorney fees, while GILBERT E. BURNS sought statutory damages
based upon failure of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY to follow mandatory
procedures inAthe repossession and sale of the trailer.

The

lower court entered judgment denying the award of a deficiency
to U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, but awarded attorney fees in the
amount of $473.13.

The lower court's judgment also denied

GILBERT E. BURNS an award of statutory damages.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant GILBERT E.
BURNS seeks to have the judgment of the trial court reversed
and remanded insofar as the award of attorney fees to Respondei
and the denial of statutory damages to Appellant are concerned
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with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment denying Respondent any attorney fees, and awarding Appellant
statutory damages in the amount of $1,457.56.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On 12 October 1971, Appellant BURNS was medically
retired from the service by reason of chronic emphysema and
other physical disabilities which made him unfit for active duty.
Upon being discharged, Mr. BURNS flew directly to Cedar City,
Utah, to be with his brother who could care for him, since Mr.
BURNS was so weak and disabled as to be unable to tie his own
shoes (Transcript, page 14). Finding quarters cramped and
needing a place in which to live permanently, Mr. BURNS
approached Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY (Transcript, page 15).
On or about 19 October 1971, Appellant BURNS informed
one Scott Urie, employee and agent of U. & S. MOTORS, concerning
a vehicle which could be used by Appellant as a permanent
residence.

Appellant informed U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY of his

needs, and was assured that the recreational trailer subsequently
purchased would meet Mr. BURNS' needs for a permanent place of
residence (Transcript, pages 20-21).

On the same day, Appellant

purchased the recreational trailer in the firm belief, based
upon the assurances of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY'S agent, Urie,
that the vehicle would serve as a permanent home, and took the
trailer from the sales lot.

Later, on 28 October 1971, Mr.

BURNS signed the Retail Installment Contract provided by U. & S.
MOTORS, which covered the sale of the trailer (Exhibit #1).
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Immediately upon taking possession of the trailer,
Mr. BURNS attempted to establish it as a permanent home structure, but began to experience innumerable difficulties generall
inherent in the design of the unit, which, rather than being
suitable for permanent residence as had been stated by U. & S.
MOTOR COMPANY, was a unit specifically designed for mobile,
highway use, and for short periods of temporary occupancy
(Memorandum Decision, page 2).
Among other things, toilet and plumbing facilities
of the trailer were constantly in a non-functional state.

At

trial, U. & S. MOTOR1s agent testified that in order for the
plumbing facilities to function properly, the unit had to be
moved frequently, since road action was necessary to keep soli<
broken up.

Lighting fixtures and wiring were adequate only foi

auxiliary use.

Rodents and insects were able to penetrate the

trailer at will (Memorandum Decision, pages 2-3). Lights and
wiring crumbled, melted, and smoked (Transcript, pages 27-31).
Shorts in the wiring caused the trailer shell itself to be
electrified, causing shocks to Mr. BURNS and his pet (Transcri]
page 35). A vent on the top of the trailer leaked (Transcript
page 36). The furnace wouldn't function properly in cold
weather (Transcript, pages 36-37).
Appellant BURNS many times attempted to get U. & S.
MOTOR COMPANY to remedy the defects, with only a perfunctory
response.

In November of 1971, Mr. BURNS moved out of the

trailer, due to the stink and general difficulties inherent in
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the trailer (Transcript, pages 37-38).

In an effort to get

the problems corrected, Mr. BURNS discontinued payments on
the vehicle, and this action was filed on 25 January 1973 to
repossess the trailer and collect money alleged to be owed by
Mr. BURNS.

BURNS cross-claimed against U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY,

and at trial, the lower court determined that U. & S. MOTOR
COMPANY had breached its warranty that the trailer was fit for
use as a stationary house trailer, rescinded the dontract of
purchase, and gave judgment to Appellant BURNS in the amount
of $2,388.81, with interest and costs, but subject to an offset in favor of Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY in the amount
of $883.47 (Memorandum Decision; Conclusions of Law).
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY appealed.

This Court found

that any warranty of fitness had been disclaimed in writing,
and reversed and remanded, with instructions to the trial court
to determine any deficiency, and to determine any award of
attorney fees and costs (Remittitur, and Opinion),
The recreational trailer was subsequently repossessed
by U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, reconditioned, and sold, but not pursuant to any order of the lower court (Affidavit of Scott M.
Urie).

No written notice of the time, date, place and manner

of sale of the trailer was aver given to Mr. BURNS (Judgment
dated 17 May 1976, and Affidavit of BURNS dated 6 September 1975).
Had Appellant BURNS been given such notice, he would have taken
every step available to protect his rights in the trailer (Affidavit of Mr. BURNS dated 6 September 1975).
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On 21 April 1975,

U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY moved that the lower court grant judgment
against Mr. B U M S for a claimed deficiency of $517.00, claimed
attorney fees of $1,500.00, costs, and other relief (Motion,
dated 18 April 1975).

On or about 20 August 1975, U. & S.

MOTOR COMPANY supported its Motion with the Affidavit of Scott
M. Urie, alleging a deficiency of $517.00, but providing no
accounting of the amount received for the trailer, or of the
amounts expended in retaking the vehicle, storing, reconditioning, and selling it, if any.

Also on or about 20 August 1975,

U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY'S counsel filed the Affidavit of Michael
W. Park, setting forth that a reasonable attorney fee was the
amount of $473.13, not $1,500.00 as claimed in the Motion.
On 8 September 1975, Mr. BURNS' Affidavit Supporting
Continuation of Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to U. & S. Motor Company's Motion for Deficiency Judgment
and Attorney Fees was filed, and on 1 October 1975, Mr. BURNS
filed a Motion for Relief in the Form of Judgment, seeking
judgment against U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY in the amount of $1,457
based upon U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY'S failure to follow mandatory
procedure in the repossession and sale of the trailer.

The

lower court took both motions under advisement, and on 17 May
1976, signed the Judgment denying Respondent any deficiency,
awarded Respondent $473.13 as .attorney fees, and denied Appell
BURNS judgment in the amount of $1,457.56, even though the cou
specifically found that no written notice of the time, date,
place and manner of sale of the repossessed trailer was ever
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mailed or given to Appellant BURNS (Judgment, dated 17 May
1976).

From this Judgment, Mr. BURNS appealed those portions

granting U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY $473.13 as attorney fees, and
denying Appellant judgment against U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY in
the amount of $1,457.56.

Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY did

not appeal that portion of the Judgment denying a deficiency
judgment against Appellant BURNS.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
WHEN IT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO U. & S.
MOTOR COMPANY FOR THE REASON THAT U. & S.
MOTOR COMPANY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF LAW IN THE REPOSSESSION AND SALE OF THE TRAILER, AND FAILED
TO PROPERLY APPLY THE PROCEEDS OF SUCH SALE.
It is abundantly clear from the record that Respondent
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY did not send notice of the method, date,
time, place and manner of sale to Appellant BURNS, nor was a
detailed accounting of the proceeds of the sale ever provided.
There is nothing in the record to indicate to whom the sale was
made, and the circumstances of this case from start to finish
give rise to a certain skepticism as to the propriety of the
actions of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY and its agents. Therefore,
the lower court's award of attorney fees should be reversed,
for the following reasons:
a.

U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, as a matter of law, is and

was not entitled to an award of attorney fees for the reason
that it failed to send notice of the time, place, and manner of

-7-

sale to Appellant.

The lower court specifically found that

U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY failed to send notice of the time, date,
place and manner of the sale of the repossessed trailer to
Appellant BURNS.

This failure, especially where proceeds of

the sale have been misapplied, as set forth in paragraph "c"
below, and where the sale was commercially unreasonable, as
shown in "b" below, requires that the award of attorney fees
be reversed.
U.C.A. 70A-9-504(3) provides for notice to be given
by a foreclosing seller to the debtor.

The law states:

"Unless collateral is perishable or threatens
to decline speedily in value or is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market,
reasonable notification of the time and place
of any public sale or reasonable notification
of the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made shall
be sent by the secured party to the debtor™
(Emphasis supplied).
Language of the statute is in the mandatory mode.

The collates

in this case was a trailer house, definitely not the sort of
collateral which is perishable or which threatens to decline
speedily in value, as might fruit or vegetables.

In addition,

a repossessed Roadrunner trailer house is not the type of
collateral customarily sold on a recognized market.

See

Community Management Association v. Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314
(Colo.App.).

There simply does not exist a recognized market

for the sale of repossessed Roadrunner trailers.. Since the
collateral was not perishable, did not threaten to decline
speedily in value, and is not the type customarily sold on a
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recognized market, U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY was required to
send notice of the disposition to Appellant BURNS.

This it

failed to do.
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY does not contest the fact that
it did not send notification to Mr. BURNS, but only argues that
the results of the previous appeal to this Court were such
notification required by the statute.

There is no merit to

Respondent's contention for the reason that the notice required
is notice of the time and place of sale, and whether public
sale is involved, or private sale or other disposition.

The

order of this Court on the previous appeal was that:
11

. . . the judgment of the District Court
herein be, and the same is, reversed and
remanded with directions to order a sale
of the trailer . ! ". " (Remittitur, emphasis
added).
The record shows no such order of the District Court requiring
the sale of the trailer, and Respondent is therefore not only
in violation of the statutory law concerning repossession and
sale of collateral, but is in direct violation of the law of
this case, since, pursuant to the above, the sale was only to
be conducted by order of the District Court.
ever occurred.

No judicial sale

Obviously, had such a sale been ordered,

'Appellant BURNS would have b.een protected, in that he would
undoubtedly have received notice from the District Court of
the time, place, and manner of the proposed sale, and in that
he would have had opportunity to exercise his statutory right
of redemption, granted by U.C.A. 70A-9-506 (1953, as amended),
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prior to any such sale.

Having violated the terms of the

earlier remand, Respondent cannot claim that the same was the
notice to Respondent required by the statute.

We must presume

that the order contained in the Remittitur meant that the sale
was to be conducted according to law, and Respondent has
violated both statutory law and the law of this case as to the
sale of the trailer.

The failure to follow the law voided

any right of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY to attorney fees or to a
deficiency judgment.

The Respondent cannot rely on the pre-

vious opinion of this Court to cover its egregious errors in
failing to follow the law covering disposition of collateral.
As a matter of fact, it is impossible to determine from the
record just when the sale took place, and it is thoroughly
possible that it occurred prior to the date of the Remittitur
of this Court, or to a friend, employee, or relative of Mr.
Urie, or to Respondent itself, at a sacrifice price.

The fail-

ure to supply details of the time, place, and manner of sale,
and the failure to provide a proper accounting, justifiably
arouses suspicion.
Where a creditor does not strictly comply with the
notice provisions of U.C.A. 70A-9-504(3) (1953, as amended),
the proper remedy is to deny him an award of attorney fees,
especially where such an award takes the nature of a deficiency
judgment after the seller has improperly applied the proceeds
received from the sale, which proceeds should have been applied
to the payment of attorney fees prior to the satisfaction of
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(

indebtedness.

Had the proceeds been properly applied, the

question in the lower court would have been one as to the
propriety of awarding a deficiency judgment where no notice
was given to the debtor, which question was decided favorably
to Appellant, and which Respondent did not appeal.

The law

in this case, therefore, is that failure to give proper notice
bars an action for a deficiency judgment.

For other cases in

which a deficiency judgment was denied for failure to give
notice, see Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo.); Alliance
Discount Corporation v. Shaw, 195 Pa.Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548;
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 222 F.Supp. 696
(D.C.Pa.), vac. other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (CA 3rd); Brasswell
v. American National Bank, 117 Ga.App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420;
Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill.App.3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180; and Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corporation v. Atlas Shirt Company,
66 Misc.2d 1089, 323 NYS2d 13.
In all fairness, it must be admitted that there is
a minority position which would permit the award of a deficiency
under certain circumstances, even though the seller failed to
give the required notice.

Community Management, supra.

The

better and majority rule, however, is to deny it, for the
reason that failure to give the required notice unjustly
deprives the debtor of his right to redeem the collateral,
which right is afforded to him by U.C.A. 70A-9-506 (1953, as
amended).

It is clear from the record that Mr. BURNS would have

taken every step available to protect his interests in the
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collateral had he been given notice.
b.

U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, as a matter of law, is not

and was not entitled to an award of attorney fees for the reason that it has failed to make a showing that the repossession
sale was commercially reasonable, and said sale was commercially
unreasonable.

The record of this case clearly shows that

GILBERT E. BURNS bought the trailer for his own personal and
household use, and that U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY was a merchant
with respect to the goods sold, held a security interest in the
trailer, and sought to foreclose the same.

The Utah Uniform

Commercial Code applies, as determined by this Court on the previous appeal.
U.C.A. 70A-9-504(3) requires that:
11

. . . every aspect of the disposition, including the method, manner, time, place and terms,
must be commercially reasonable." (Emphasis
added.)
The burden of establishing the reasonableness of the
disposition is upon the secured party.

See Vic Hansen & Sons,

Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis.2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728, 59 A.L.R.3d 369
In this case, where a secret sale was made, where no notice of
the method, manner, time, place and terms of the sale was
given to Appellant, and where Respondent claims to have reconditioned the trailer, but gave no accounting of any expenses
of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling, and the like
to Appellant, the sale was clearly commercially unreasonable.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the award of attorney
fees, and deny the same to Respondent.
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c.

U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, as a matter of law, is

not and was not entitled to an award of attorney fees for the
reason that the proceeds of the repossession sale were not
applied according to law.

It is undisputed that after having

repossessed the trailer, U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY sold the same,
and the entire proceeds of the sale, whether the sale was
public or private, were applied to partial satisfaction of
the principal amount owed by Appellant to Respondent.

Such

application was improper, and not authorized by Utah law.
U.C.A. 70A-9-504(l) (1953, as amended) states in part:
"The proceeds of disposition shall be applied
in the order following to (a) the reasonable
expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for
sale, selling, leasing and the like and, to the
extent not prohibited by law, the reasonable
attorneyfs fees and legal expenses incurred by
the secured party; (b) the satisfaction of
indebtedness secured . . . " (Emphasis added) .
The wording of the statute is mandatory.

The Affidavit

of Scott M. Urie shows conclusively that the proceeds from the
sale of the trailer were not applied in accordance with law.
The amount owing by Mr. BURNS to U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY was
$3,155.25 (Transcript, page 9, lines 23-25).

U. & S. MOTOR

COMPANY claimed a deficiency of $517.00 and attorney fees of
$473.13.

Simple subtraction shows that at least $2,638.25 of

the proceeds were applied to satisfaction of indebtedness.
Such an amount would have been more than enough to satisfy
the claimed attorney fee of $473.13, had it been taken from
the proceeds, but having chosen to apply such amount to the
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indebtedness rather than attorney fees, Respondent cannot now
be heard to claim attorney fees.

Attorney fees, in cases such

as this, can only come from the proceeds of the sale, and where
the proceeds have been exhausted by prior application to other
categories, it is error to award attorney fees.

See Florida

First National Bank v. Fryd Construction Company, 240 So.2d 883
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
IN FAILING TO GRANT JUDGMENT TO APPELLANT
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,457.56, IT HAVING BEEN
ESTABLISHED THAT U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY
FAILED TO FOLLOW MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF
LAW IN TkE REPOSSESSION AND SALE OF THE
ROADRUNNER MOBILE HOME, AND FAILED TO
PROPERLY APPLY AND DISTRIBUTE THE PROCEEDS
OF THE SALE.
As shown by Exhibit 1 in the record, on or about
28 October 1971, Appellant BURNS signed a retail installment
contract covering the purchase of a recreational trailer.
cash price was $4,540.00.
was involved.

The

A trade-in allowance of $1,000.00

There was an unpaid balance of cash price in

the amount of $3,540.00, physical damage insurance in the sum
of $160.00, credit life insurance in the sum of $102.24, and a
total unpaid balance of $3,802.24.

The contract provided for

a finance charge in the amount of $741.32.
payment price came to $5,543.56.

The total deferred

See Exhibit 1, Record.

Appellant BURNS defaulted on the contract, and U. &
S. MOTOR COMPANY repossessed the trailer.

Thereafter, without

notice to Appellant, Respondent sold the trailer at secret
private sale, in a commercially unreasonable manner, and appli
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the proceeds of the sale in a manner not authorized by law,
all as set forth in Point I above.

For these reasons, and the

following, Appellant is entitled to a reversal of the order of
the lower court denying judgment to Appellant, and to a remand
with instructions to the lower court to enter judgment for
Appellant in the amount of $1,457.56.
a.

Utah law provides a remedy to a debtor where a

creditor has failed to follow the statutory procedure for repossession and sale of collateral, and has failed to properly
apply the proceeds of such sale.

U.C.A. 70A-9-507(l) provides:

"If it is established that the secured party
is not proceeding in accordance with the
provisions of this part disposition may be
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms
and conditions. If the disposition has
occurred the debtor or any person entitled
to notification or whose security interest
has been made known to the secured party
prior to the disposition has a right to
recover from the secured party any loss
caused by a failure to comply with the provisions of this part. If the collateral is
consumer goods, the debtor has a right to
recover in any event an amount not less than
the credit service charge plus ten per cent
of the principal amount of the debt or the
time price differential plus ten per cent of
the cash price.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
It can be readily seen that where a creditor fails to comply
with the provisions of law governing the repossession and sale
of collateral, and the subsequent application of proceeds, the
debtor may recover his damages from the creditor.

More import-

antly, where the collateral consists of consumer goods, the law
provides a minimum rule of recovery for the debtor.
Comment 1 to Uniform Commercial Code, §9-507(1).
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See

b.

Utah law required that notice be sent to Appellant

BURNS of the time, place, and manner of disposition of the
trailer, and no such notice was sent.

See I.a. supra, for dis-

cussion of Utah law concerning notice

and the failure of U. &

S. MOTOR COMPANY to send the same to Appellant.
c.

Utah law required that sale of the repossessed

trailer be accomplished in a commercially reasonable manner,
but the sale was made in a commercially unreasonable manner and
Respondent failed to show the sale was commercially reasonable.
See I.b. supra.
d.

Utah law established the priority of application

of the proceeds from the sale of the trailer, and Respondent
failed to so apply the proceeds, but applied them in a manner
other than that provided by law.

See I.e. supra, for analysis

of Utah law concerning application of proceeds.
e.

The collateral in this case is consumer goods.

U.C.A. 70A-9-109(l) states in part:
"Goods are 'consumer goods1, if they are
used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes . . ."
The record in this case is replete with references to the fact
that Appellant BURNS purchased the Roadrunner trailer for his
own personal and household purposes.

Such being true, the

trailer was consumer goods, and Appellant is entitled to the
statutory minimum recovery allowed by reason of U. & S. MOTOR
COMPANY'* failure to follow statutory procedure in the reposses
sion, the sale of the trailer, and in the improper application

-16-

of proceeds.
f.

As a matter of law, Appellant GILBERT E. BURNS

is and was entitled to Judgment against Respondent U. & S.
MOTOR COMPANY, it having been established that Respondent
failed to follow mandatory provisions of law in the repossession and sale of the Roadrunner recreational trailer, and in
applying the proceeds of the sale.

U.C.A. 70A-9-507(l) states

in part, referring to a situation where disposition of consumer
goods has occurred with the seller having failed to comply with
statutory provisions concerning repossession, sale, and application of proceeds, or has failed in any other manner to comply
with appropriate provisions of law:
lf

If the collateral is consumer goods, the
debtor has a right to recover in any event
an amount not less than the credit service
charge plus ten per cent of the principal
amount of the debt, or the time price differential plus ten per cent of the cash
price."
Simple computations then establish Appellant's right to judgment
in the amount of $1,457.56:
Deferred payment price:
Less cash price:
Equals time price differential:
Plus ten per cent of cash price:
Equals amount due to debtor:

$5,543.56
4,540.00
$1,003 .56
454.00
$1,457.56

In addition to the statutory language cited, see
Atlas Credit Corporation v. Dolbow, 193 Pa.Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704,
where the Pennsylvania Court permitted recovery of damages under
the rule pertaining to consumer goods where the creditor sold a
repossessed boat without giving notice to the debtor.
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CONCLUSION
It appearing from the facts plainly apparent on the
record that Respondent did not follow mandatory statutory procedure, or the procedure set forth by this Court in its previous
Remittitur, in the repossession and sale of the Roadrunner
trailer, but held a secret, private sale without giving notification to Appellant of the time, place, and manner of sale, and
it appearing that the proceeds of the sale were not applied as
set forth by law, and that due to the failure of Respondent to
follow mandatory procedure, the sale cannot be deemed to have
been conducted in a commercially reasonable manner, and because
of the oppressive and overreaching conduct of Respondent at all
stages of the proceedings, the Judgment of the trial court
should be reversed and remanded, with instructions to vacate
the award of $473.13 attorney fees to Respondent, and to enter
Judgment in favor of Appellant in the amount of $1,457.56.
DATED:

16 August 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
MORRIS AND BISHOP
Willard R. Bishop
172 North Main Street
P. 0. Box 279
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Attorneys for Defendant/ThirdParty Plaintiff/Appellant
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